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The acquisition of genetic information (GI) confronts both the affected individuals and 
healthcare providers with difficult, ambivalent decisions. Genetic responsibility (GR) 
has become a key concept in both ethical and socioempirical literature addressing 
how and by whom decision-making with respect to the morality of GI is approached. 
However, despite its prominence, the precise meaning of the concept of GR remains 
vague. Therefore, we conducted a systematic literature review on the usage of the 
concept of GR in qualitative, socioempirical studies, to identify the main interpretations 
and to provide conceptual clarification. The review identified 75 studies with primarily 
an Anglo-American setting. The studies focused on several agents: the individual, 
the family, the parent, the healthcare professional, and the institution and refer to 
the concept of GR on the basis of either a rational/principle-oriented approach or an 
affective/relational approach. A subtype of the rational/principle-oriented approach is 
the reactive approach. The review shows how the concept of GR is useful for analyzing 
and theorizing about socioempirical findings within qualitative socioempirical studies 
and also reveals conceptual deficits in terms of insufficient theoretical accuracy and 
heterogeneity, and in the rarity of reflection on cultural variance. The vagueness and 
multiplicity of meanings for GR in socioempirical studies can be avoided by more 
normative-theoretical explication of the underlying premises. This would provide a higher 
degree of differentiation of empirical findings. Thereby, the complex findings associated 
with the individual and social implications of genetic testing in empirical studies can be 
better addressed from a theoretical point of view and can subsequently have a stronger 
impact on normative and policy debates.
Keywords: genetic responsibility, systematic review, qualitative studies, genetic counseling, decision making, lay 
persons, professionals, bioethics
inTrODUcTiOn
In the past 30  years, the technical possibilities for producing risk information in genetics have 
increased substantially and quantitatively. From visual chromosome analysis of aberrations (e.g., for 
Down syndrome) to more advanced testing for rare genetic disorders based on polymerase chain 
reaction, next-generation sequencing, genome-wide association studies, and “personalized” medical 
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treatments, the field of predictive medical genetics has grown 
dramatically. However, skepticism about the consequences of 
using genetic information (GI)1 and the validity of most of the 
current tests remains. This has led to a series of unsolved ques-
tions: What does this information mean? Do we want to have 
this type of information? If so, how can we manage and act upon 
the genetic risk? If not, is it responsible to continue testing? Does 
this information impose personal and familial responsibilities to 
minimize risk for genetic disease development?
These questions counter the optimistic opinions of some moral 
philosophers (Harris, 1998; Buchanan et  al., 2007) who have 
suggested that genetic risk information allows us to move away 
from our dependency on nature and take control of our fates. 
They argue, from the perspective of the promotion of individual 
autonomy and choice, that neglecting genetic risk information 
and not using it for one’s own and the common good is morally 
dubious.
Apart from the rhetoric of choice, another moral concept has 
shaped the debate on genetic testing (GT) since the 1970s: that 
of “responsibility” or, more concretely, “genetic responsibility” 
(GR). The latter term was coined by Lipkin and Rowley (1974) 
to argue in favor of reproductive and positive eugenic considera-
tions from a collective responsibility point of view. They stated 
that mankind should use the opportunities of emerging genetic 
science to act “responsibly” toward the next generations by 
avoiding the inheritance of diseases (Fletcher, 1974). This revival 
of eugenic virtues was embedded in the emerging awareness of 
limited natural resources, a growing world population and an 
ecological crisis, as prominently discussed in the “Club of Rome” 
report (Meadows, 1972). Another approach to the concept was 
initiated by the sociologist Nikolas Rose and followers, who theo-
rized that GR reflects the biopolitical impact of a more and more 
genetic “denkstil” (thought style) on individual life styles and 
thus on conceptualizations of the self and its relation toward the 
sociopolitical realm (Lemke, 2006; Rose, 2007). Summing these 
notions up, the term appears to be associated with ambivalence, 
individual and social conflict, and a critical attempt at improving 
genetic practice.
The widespread usage of the term GR and the related notion 
of “responsibilization” in health care is often related to the 
sociopolitical paradigm of invoking individual responsibility 
and the citizen’s need to take actions for health risks instead 
of promoting collective or state solutions to handle those 
risks. From a theoretical point of view, this is a very intrigu-
ing phenomenon because, in bioethics, “responsibility” has so 
many conceptual and historical meanings [for an overview, cf. 
Schicktanz and Schweda (2012)]. Furthermore, philosophers, 
bioethicists, social scientists, and medical professionals often 
use it in different ways without providing sufficiently clear defi-
nitions. Starting from these observations, in this review, we have 
1 We refer to GT as a medical test that identifies changes in chromosomes, genes, 
or proteins. GI in a narrow sense refers to information acquired via GT, yet the 
term may also include other information about an individual acquired in the 
context of GT and genetic counselling that is not a direct result of the techno-
logical application (e.g., family trees) (Lister Hill National Center for Biomedical 
Communications, 2016).
examined the following research questions: which concepts of 
GR are applied in qualitative, socioempirical studies and how 
are these concepts used to explain empirical findings on moral 
attitudes toward GT and GI?2
The objectives of this review were threefold. First, we aimed 
to summarize and analyze how existing qualitative studies have 
applied, described, and theorized about the notion of GR; for 
this, we used a general philosophical notion of responsibility as 
a theoretical premise to detect references to GR in the material. 
Second, we aimed to provide a classification of approaches to the 
concept of GR and to analyze similarities and variances within 
this classification. We based our classification on a philosophi-
cally informed structure that addressed the main agents and 
contexts of GT and GI. Third, we aimed to discuss important 
inconsistencies in the literature on GR and, to promote a 
closer interaction between empirical medical sociology and 
bioethics, to make suggestions for overcoming this inconsistent 
terminology.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
Theoretical Background
For the purposes of this systematic review, we have used a general, 
meta-ethical framework of responsibility that captures the vari-
ous local and contextual conceptual meanings of “responsibility” 
(Schicktanz and Schweda, 2012). This offers the advantage of 
integrating various meanings of “responsibility” into one consist-
ent general concept. Based on the idea that responsibility could 
be seen as a formal expression of any moral statement by which 
we account other people as moral beings (Strawson, 2008), this 
general concept not only accounts for the plurality of approaches 
to GR in bioethics and medical sociology literature but also 
avoids a one-sided, reductionist interpretation, where “being 
responsible” is equivalent to “being blameworthy” or “being 
guilty” (Schicktanz and Schweda, 2012; Schicktanz, 2016).
Overall, the concept of responsibility can be seen as involv-
ing seven relata (Schicktanz and Schweda, 2012): someone (the 
moral agent) is, in a particular time frame (time), retrospectively 
or prospectively (temporal direction) responsible for something 
or someone (the moral object) with respect to someone (the norm 
proofing authority/enforcement) on the basis of certain standards 
(norms) with certain consequences (sanctions or rewards).
We expected that the current literature on GT would show 
aspects of all seven dimensions of responsibility. At the same 
time, we did not assume that the colloquial concept of GR in 
empirical studies would encompass all of these dimensions at 
once.3 Thus, this general formula of responsibility was used to 
2 This review is part of a larger project in which yet unclarified conceptual uses of 
GR in the wider bioethical and biopolitical discourse about GT are being analyzed. 
A second analysis, in which we aim to analyze the concept of GR in the ethical 
literature, is currently in preparation.
3 Although the temporal dimension of responsibility is well acknowledged in 
the theoretical discussion, the spatial dimension is yet insufficiently addressed. 
However, an implicit way of addressing the spatial dimension can be seen in the 
way how the relationship between the moral agent and moral object is construed 
and addressed. We can think of social closeness (e.g., such as in family) as a 
FigUre 1 | research strategy for socioempirical studies referring to 
‘responsibility’ in genetic testing. *The default time restriction in Web of 
Science is 1945.
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allow us to distinguish a wide variety of concepts of GR, while 
analyzing the specific concepts present in the literature from one, 
unified point of view.
This formula enabled us to structure the variety of concepts 
associated with GR found in the material and to distinguish the 
usages of GR along such dimensions as “agent,” “object,” “norm,” 
“consequences,” etc., if applicable.
search strategies
The literature search was performed in January 2016 in the 
PubMed and Web of Science databases to include all articles 
published in English and German4 from 1945 to the present (for 
search strings, cf. Figure 1). These searches were complemented 
by a search for gray literature from monographs and anthologies, 
drawing on resources at the University of Göttingen.
selection criteria
We compiled a comprehensive corpus of literature in which both 
“genetic risk” and “responsibility” were broadly discussed with 
regard to practical possibilities offered by the new genetics. To 
achieve this, we included all publications in English or German 
that examined GT or genetic screening and used the term 
“responsibility” in the title, abstract, or keywords (cf. Figure 2). 
A search limited to the narrow term “genetic responsibility” 
would have led to a biased picture, because in a pilot search, we 
identified many relevant studies closely connecting responsibil-
ity and genetic risk but not using “genetic responsibility” as a 
key term.
We also included related articles from the gray literature where 
“responsibility” was only indirectly addressed via reference to 
duties and obligations to conform to social or moral norms in 
the context of decision making about GT. Articles referring to 
“responsibility” or “being responsible” exclusively in the sense of 
“being the cause for” were excluded, as such expressions did not 
convey the moral meaning of GR we wanted. As we aimed to 
track GR in the scientific discourse, we only included original 
scientific work, scientific review papers, peer comments to these 
works, and reports of ethics committees. Editorials, conference 
abstracts, letters to the editor, method reports, and reader surveys 
were thus excluded.
Thematically, we excluded papers that focused on (a) genetic 
ancestry testing; (b) GT of non-human animals; (c) the efficient 
administration of genetic screening programs; (d) storage of 
genetic material in the laboratory; (e) the biotechnical function 
of genetic tests; (f) insurance procedures to assess genetic risk; 
(g) the construction of scientific entities such as the concept 
of the “gene”; (h) genetic discrimination, in cases where there 
was no obvious relation with GR; (i) national and international 
legal regulations on the management of GI; (j) responsibility of 
healthcare professionals, if there was no explicit reference to the 
constructive manner of space as well as of narrow distances that matter (e.g., 
exchanging GI in a same room of a hospital). The latter is then a geographical 
manner of space (Simmel, 1971).
4 The search was performed with no time limitations. However, it was limited by 
the maximal timeframe offered by the databases (i.e., 1945–2016) and the authors’ 
language skills. 
management of GI; (k) responsibility of researchers working on 
the Human Genome Project and on whole-genome sequencing; 
and (l) prenatal or pre-implantation testing if GT or GI was 
not mentioned.
A total of 228 duplicates were removed from the corpus. 
The selection criteria were applied by assessing each remaining 
paper after reading the title, abstract, and keywords. At least 
two researchers (Jon Leefmann and Manuel Schaper/Silke 
Schicktanz) assessed the papers independently. If a decision 
could not be made on this basis, the whole paper was read and a 
consensus was sought. With regard to our aim of reviewing the 
conceptual uses of GR in qualitative studies, our assessment of 
the robustness of the evidence drawn from the studies did not 
FigUre 2 | Final inclusion and exclusion of studies to the corpus.
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consider criteria such as representativeness of the included stud-
ies as central. Instead, we excluded qualitative studies only if their 
methodology was missing or if the paper used qualitative data 
only anecdotally. Application of these selection criteria yielded a 
total of 353 publications.
Data extraction
We then divided the publications into empirical studies and non-
empirical papers reflecting on ethical, legal, and social aspects 
of the new genetics for separate analysis and later comparison. 
Non-empirical papers were excluded. Every paper reporting 
data acquisition and/or presenting methodologically sound 
data analysis (quantitative and qualitative) was considered as 
an empirical study. This criterion also applied to studies that 
drew on empirical data for ethical analysis or to theorize about 
social processes related to genetics (n  =  101). Of these we 
excluded review papers, quantitative studies, and case stud-
ies (n  =  26), limiting the reviewed literature to qualitative, 
socioempirical studies. This restriction is justified because our 
research questions aimed at the various interpretations of GR 
generated from empirical material. As quantitative studies tend 
to prompt the respondent’s attitudes using predefined concepts, 
the conceptual uses are limited, and the process of conceptual 
construction is usually not documented in the studies. Hence, 
qualitative studies provided much better background for our 
interests (Flick, 2009). Thus, we obtained a comparatively 
homogeneous corpus in terms of study design (cf. Table 1 in 
Supplementary Material). Finally, 75 qualitative, socioempirical 
studies that referred to GR in the context of GT were identified 
(cf. Figure  2).
From these 75 studies, all 3 authors independently collected 
data on the size of the data sample, country of origin, study design 
(type of data acquisition and method of analysis), research topic, 
and the following outcome measures: medical genetic context, 
agents of responsible behavior, objects of responsible behavior, 
norms of responsibility, potential conflicts of responsibility 
norms, definition of responsibility, and purpose of conceptual 
use (cf. Table 1 in Supplementary Material).
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analysis
We have used a descriptive approach to the literature corpus 
(part 1) and a narrative synthesis approach (part 2). In part 
1, we used the criteria commonly used in the PRISMA pro-
tocol for systematic reviews, as applicable to the qualitative 
data (Liberati et  al., 2009), providing a detailed protocol for 
inclusion and exclusion criteria (Figure  1), the sizes of each 
of the thematic categories or subcategories, and a systematic 
characterization of the literature corpus in terms of sample 
size, date of publication, national context, and disease model 
for each of the studies. In part 2, we based our analysis on the 
narrative synthesis approach developed by Popay et al. (2006) 
and also described by Ryan (2013). This approach is suitable for 
reviewing large sets of studies, which vary greatly in methodol-
ogy and research focus and which cannot be summarized using 
statistical tools. Our narrative synthesis in principle follows the 
recommended steps of (i) theorizing about the phenomenon 
under investigation, (ii) developing a preliminary synthesis of 
the findings from the literature by thematically categorizing 
the studies and by summarizing key findings, (iii) exploring 
relationships within and between the different studies, and 
(iv) assessing the robustness of the synthesis of the findings 
[see also (Strech and Sofaer, 2012)]. As this methodological 
approach is normally used to review the effects of clinical 
interventions, however, we modified our narrative synthesis 
according to our purpose: instead of a theory of the changes 
produced by the clinical intervention (Weiss, 1998; Popay 
et  al., 2006), which is suitable for investigating cause–effect 
mechanisms, we have referred to the theoretical analysis of the 
concept of responsibility as provided by the general formula 
outlined in Section “Theoretical background.” Like the theory 
of intervention leading to changes, as in the original approach, 
this formula provided the framework for searching for factors 
in the studies, which could explain similarities and differences 
in the conceptual use of the term GR. For instance, the most 
central relata (e.g., agent, object, norm) often function as 
indicators for the thematic contextualization of a study (e.g., 
family communication, professional duties, agency, etc.). These 
similarities were used to develop a preliminary synthesis of 
all our findings and to thematically categorize the studies 
accordingly. The results of this preliminary synthesis of the 
findings are plotted in Table 1 in Supplementary Material. We 
further analyzed these findings to identify overall patterns 
concerning references to or conceptual uses of GR. Close 
reading of the material allowed us to generate hypotheses on 
conceptual uses, which we repeatedly and iteratively revised in 
the light of further gathered data from the material. Using this 
inductive process resulted in two stable categories of conceptual 
uses of GR: one use referring to a rational/principle-oriented 
meaning and another use relating to an affective/relational 
meaning. A particular subtype that occurred within the first 
category is the “reactive” conception, as we will explain later 
on. Interpretations based on these categories form the main 
part of part 2 of the Section “Results.” We have also provided 
an overall, critical assessment of our synthesis of the findings 
in the section “Discussion.”
resUlTs
Part 1: general Description of the 
literature corpus
Quality of Included Studies
The sample sizes and methodology of most of the studies (cf. 
Section “Methods of Data Acquisition and Analysis” and Table 1 
in Supplementary Material) indicated that most were of sufficient 
quality in terms of basic methodology. For an assessment in terms 
of the conceptual use of GR, we looked for conclusive definitions 
of GR in the studies and tracked quotations and references that 
might expose a theoretical discussion of GR. While we only found 
21 studies offering a conclusive definition of GR (Burgess and 
d’Agincourt-Canning, 2001; d’Agincourt-Canning, 2001, 2006; 
Downing, 2005; Hallowell et  al., 2006; Arribas-Ayllon et  al., 
2008a,b, 2011; Bickerstaff et al., 2008; Etchegary and Fowler, 2008; 
Etchegary et al., 2009, 2015; Raz and Schicktanz, 2009; Dancyger 
et al., 2010; Hines et al., 2010; Clarke et al., 2011; Weiner, 2011; 
Donnelly et al., 2013; Boardman, 2014b; D’Audiffret Van Haecke 
and de Montgolfier, 2015; Ross, 2015), all but 17 of the included 
studies made reference to non-empirical literature, such as 
philosophical or bioethical papers referring to or using GR (cf. 
Data Sheet 1). We took both these measures as indications of 
the authors’ awareness of the conceptual discourses on GR in 
philosophy and bioethics.
Publication Types and Disciplinary Context of the 
Reviewed Studies
Among the reviewed studies, only three appeared in edited vol-
umes. The remaining 72 studies appeared in 31 distinct journals 
from different subfields of the social and the medical sciences (all 
journals are listed in the Data Sheet 1). The most frequent jour-
nals in our corpus were Journal of Genetic Counseling (n = 13), 
Social Science and Medicine (n =  10), Sociology of Health and 
Illness (n =  5), and Clinical Biochemistry (n =  5). We used the 
Scientific Journal Ranking Subject Area Classification (cf. www.
scimagojr.com) to assess, which academic audience was mainly 
addressed by the journals. Among the 31 journals, only 9 can 
be unambiguously identified as medical journals. The remaining 
22 journals were classified as social sciences or the humanities 
journals with an interdisciplinary audience ranging from social 
scientists to medical practitioners to applied ethicists. However, 
it is remarkable that the 9 journals clearly identified as medical 
journals contributed to 27 studies, which amounts to more than 
a third of the whole literature corpus. This comparatively large 
number suggests the existence of a significant readership inter-
ested in GR beyond medical sociology and medical ethics.
Frequency of Studies over Time
Even though the use of GR as a theoretical concept dates back at 
least to the 1974 anthology by Lipkin and Rowley (1974), we found 
that the term did not play a significant role in qualitative socioem-
pirical studies before the early 1990s. From then on, we found a 
steady increase of publications referring to GR between 1993 and 
2015 in our material (cf. Figure 3A). We assume that this increase is 
likely due to an augmentation of the number of studies addressing 
FigUre 3 | Frequency of studies over time (a) and distribution of the retrieved qualitative socioempirical studies over different countries of origin 
(B). (a) The different colored planes indicate different thematic contexts of responsibility: GR for agency (dark blue), GR of at-risk people in the context of the family 
(light blue), professional GR (yellow), and GR of institutions (gray). The size of a plane represents the frequency of studies in a context over time. Planes add up to 
the total frequency per year. (B) Studies, which emerged from collaborations of researchers from different national backgrounds, were counted once for each 
national background involved.
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GT as such. However, we found also that GR was mainly addressed 
as “responsibility to manage information about genetic risk in the 
family context” (cf. below). The number of studies focusing on 
other thematic contexts did not increase over the years.
Methods of Data Acquisition and Analysis
Of the 75 qualitative studies included, 59 used semistructured 
interviews for data acquisition (cf. Table 1 in Supplementary 
Material). In five studies, semistructured interviews were com-
bined with focus groups or questionnaires, and eight studies used 
focus groups for data collection. In one case, (video) recorded 
counseling sessions were analyzed. Other methods included 
ethnographic field work (n = 1) and narrative interviews (n = 1). 
The number of participants in the studies varied between 8 and 
66. Various approaches were chosen for data analysis (cf. Table 1 
in Supplementary Material). The most frequently used analytical 
tools were grounded theory (n = 11), thematic analysis (n = 8), 
inductive thematic analysis (n = 8), qualitative content analysis 
(n = 8), constant comparative analysis (n = 7), rhetoric discourse 
analysis (n =  5), and interpretative phenomenological analysis 
(n = 4). Other methods were applied as well, and 16 studies did 
not explicitly mention a method used for data analysis.
National Contexts
The material displayed a highly unequal distribution of studies 
from different countries (cf. Figure 3B). The majority of stud-
ies were conducted in the United Kingdom (n = 34). Reference 
to GR was also frequent in studies from Canada (n = 11), the 
United States (n = 7), the Netherlands (n = 5), and Australia 
(n  =  5). The strong bias toward Anglo-American medical 
sociology in the sample might reflect the specificities of the 
selected databases used in the study but will also reflect our 
language restriction to English and German. However, it should 
not be dismissed that a particular thought school or “denkstil” 
is perhaps implicated.
Genetic Conditions Discussed
A total of 35 different genetic conditions were mentioned in the 
material, 13 of them as part of broader nosological categories 
such as muscular dystrophy or cardiomyopathy (for details, cf. 
Data Sheet 1). These 35 conditions included monogenetic dis-
eases such as Huntington’s disease (HD) or cystic fibrosis (CF), 
as well as multifactorial conditions and disorders such as hyper-
cholesterolemia, obesity, or arhythmogenic right ventricular 
cardiomyopathy (ARVC) (cf. Table 1 in Supplementary Material). 
The most frequent genetic conditions discussed were hereditary 
breast/ovarian cancer (HBOC) (n  =  19), HD (n  =  11), and 
hereditary non-polyposis colorectal cancer (HNPPC) (n =  6). 
Twelve studies did not specify a genetic condition. As these stud-
ies focused on testing and screening for hereditary disorders, 
almost all of the conditions are considered rare diseases by the 
European Orphanet Consortium. However, in our corpus, we 
observed a shift over time from rather monogenic diseases toward 
genetic conditions or diseases with a multifactorial etiology. 
Hypercholesterolemia, obesity, and sickle cell anemia were not 
mentioned before 2011. We also found (n = 5) studies discussing 
GR with regard to various genetic mutations that increase the risk 
of sudden death by cardiomyopathies such as ARVC, long QT 
syndrome, or hypertrophic cardiac arrest. Risk for cardiomyopa-
thy was not mentioned before 2010 in our material.
Part 2: narrative synthesis
In this section, we flashed out a detailed analysis of the concepts 
of GR occurring in the identified literature corpus and the use 
of these concepts for interpreting or theorizing about empirical 
findings. In the first step, we analyzed the moral approach to 
GR in our literature corpus. It is important to stress that these 
approaches were obtained from the examined material by an 
inductive process (see Analysis). In Section “Shared Assumptions 
on GR in the Literature Corpus,” we have distilled a basic over-
all definition of GR that was shared by most studies, although 
only implicitly by some. In Section “Moral Approaches to GR: 
Rational/Principle-Oriented vs. Affective/Relational,” we have 
analyzed the moral quality attached to GR, distilling two types 
of moral approaches from the literature corpus: rational/principle 
oriented and affective/relational. Furthermore, we distinguished a 
small subset of studies displaying a special subtype of the rational/
principle-oriented approach, which we named reactive. Finally, 
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in Section “Categories of GR Studies,” we have given a detailed 
overview of the meanings and uses of GR in the socioempirical 
literature.
Shared Assumptions on GR in the Literature Corpus
All 75 included studies shared the basic assumption that the 
knowledge derived from GT opened up a new space for action for 
the individuals or entities involved, including any affected per-
son involved in the process such as partners, children, siblings, 
parents, and other family members, and also stakeholders such 
as healthcare professionals or insurance companies. Depending 
on the accuracy and reliability of the respective genetic test, these 
agents were confronted with probabilistic risk information about 
possible future events, over which they might or might not be 
able to exert control.
The examined studies assumed that managing and handling 
this information could be socially or morally problematic on dif-
ferent levels, in different respects, and for different stakeholders. 
In all studies, the decision to undertake GT and to act on the 
basis of the test result took place in a moral and social framework 
of norms and expectations. These norms shaped the terrain of 
the morally accepted or non-accepted actions. What counted as 
responsible behavior in the context of GT was framed by socially 
negotiated norms not only between health professionals and 
laypeople but also within families.
The guiding moral principles underlying these norms 
included “respect for autonomy” and “the obligation not to 
cause harm.” Both principles were expected to hold for any 
person involved in the handling of GI regardless of their role as 
the affected individual, a relative, or a healthcare professional. 
However, these principles were frequently ambivalent and 
conflicting in the context of GT, as their appropriate realization 
varied with the genetic disorder under investigation and the 
specific intrafamilial relationships of the affected people (cf. 
Table 1 in Supplementary Material).
Ethical conflicts often discussed included the question of 
whether a duty to warn people at risk existed, and whether 
and when this duty could override the principle of respect for 
autonomy. Does one have a right not to know about one’s genetic 
risk, if accurate risk information is available and could be used 
to prevent future harm? In a similar vein, questions about not 
harming at-risk people arose. Does sharing information increase 
autonomy or cause harm because it induces risks of social or 
psychological harm? Hallowell et  al. (2003) formulated this 
conflict in terms of competing responsibilities: “At one and the 
same time, they [the affected women] saw themselves as having 
the responsibility of providing their kin with GI that would foster 
autonomous decision making about their health risk manage-
ment and as having a responsibility to protect their relatives from 
the harms that this information might cause (p. 78).”
How the affected individuals or those at risk could or actu-
ally did make a responsible decision based on the conflicting 
principles of respect for autonomy and not harming others was 
the main concern of all 75 studies. This question of responsible 
conduct was, however, addressed from various points of view. The 
underlying social relationship was approached in different ways: 
some studies, for instance, looked at these ethical conflicts from a 
gender perspective (Hallowell, 1999; d’Agincourt-Canning, 2001, 
2006; Foster et al., 2002; Hallowell et al., 2002, 2006; Forrest et al., 
2003; Rowley, 2007), whereas others focused on intercultural 
differences (Raz and Schicktanz, 2009; Shaw and Hurst, 2009; 
Raz et al., 2014) or on specific familial relationships, such as that 
between parents and their underaged children (Steinberg et al., 
2007; Arribas-Ayllon et al., 2008b).
Moral Approaches to GR: Rational/Principle-
Oriented vs. Affective/Relational
The material displayed two moral approaches to GR. Although 
they were not mutually exclusive, their focus differed in the way 
the moral quality of responsibility was interpreted. Some studies 
understood taking responsibility as the reaction of an autonomous 
agent in rationally guiding her behavior toward herself and others 
according to formal, universal moral norms. This involved tak-
ing a detached, reflective attitude toward the interests and moral 
requirements affected by a specific course of action (a rational/
principle-oriented approach). In other studies, the concept was 
approached as the reaction of a socially embedded agent guiding 
her behavior in accordance with the moral feelings and affective 
responses implied by her social role and relational identity. We 
labeled this as an affective/relational approach to responsibility, 
because it referred to close relationships built on emotions such 
as love, care, and trust.5
Interestingly, this difference resembles a classical distinction 
introduced by moral psychologists in the 1960s and 1970s to 
explain moral development (Kohlberg et  al., 1983; Gilligan, 
1987; Blum, 1993; Nunner-Winkler and Nikele, 2001). This 
debate has also influenced many discourse-based and feminist-
oriented ethical approaches (Benhabib and Cornell, 1987; 
Held, 2006). We suggest using this basic distinction (between 
a rational/principle-oriented and an affective/relational approach 
to responsibility) for further categorizing concepts of GR.
The basic rational/principle-oriented approach defined GR as 
“an integral factor in influencing an individuals’ desire whether to 
know and to act on the knowledge of their genetic risk, obligation 
of disclosure, reproductive decision-making, and genetic testing 
decisions” (Ross, 2015, p. 37). In this sense, GR comprised the 
moral obligations guiding a person’s behavior with regard to 
herself and others. Here, GR as a moral responsibility centered 
on the moral attitudes of an autonomous agent, who was capable 
of perceiving and understanding the obligations and of deciding 
whether to act upon them. A responsible agent in the rational/
principle-oriented sense was capable of justifying her actions and 
could be held accountable for them.
Notably, there was a subtype in the rational/principle-oriented 
approach to GR in the material, which primarily prevailed in 
the work of Arribas-Ayllon et al. This concept of GR, which we 
have described as “reactive,” should perhaps be conceived of as 
a “discoursal articulation [of a macro-political concept] in the 
research interview setting” (Arribas-Ayllon et al., 2008a, p. 268), 
5 We do not intend to imply that the affective/relational approach to responsibility 
is less rational than the rational/principle-oriented approach. Emotional reactions 
toward close and distant others can be rational, for instance, if they reliably track 
the morally salient features of their relationships with others.
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which indirectly mirrors the social and biopolitical norms to 
which people react. For instance, certain rhetorical strategies 
such as self-blame or the blaming of others could be interpreted 
as attempts by the affected people to justify their management of 
the genetic risks and to appear responsible for themselves and 
others against the prevalent social pressures.
The understanding of GR as an affective/relational responsi-
bility was in opposition to these two rationalistic concepts and 
drew on the social identities of the affected or at-risk people, 
taking place in the close relationships that were shaped by 
strong emotions such as love and personal trust. Nonetheless, 
this can be still understood as a moral responsibility, but one 
which mainly occurs in close relationships such as families. 
Burgess and d’Agincourt-Canning (2001) defined this kind of 
responsibility in the context of GT as “a sense of moral self that is 
largely defined by the responsibilities personally acknowledged 
as arising from particular relationships. […] this notion is 
characterized by who an individual wants to be in relation to 
others. Relational responsibility draws attention to the everyday 
morality in which people live their lives, support loved ones, and 
struggle with their own sense of self and future. It acknowledges 
that a person’s actions (and even desires) are shaped by responsi-
bilities to others. […] relational responsibility is bound up with 
the meanings people construct around their sense of self and 
moral identity (p. 363).”
This affective/relational understanding is important to the 
extent that people factually often feel obliged to act and thereby 
to take responsibility in accordance with their social role and 
identity, but cannot always rationalize or justify these moral 
commitments. Women are especially often reported to feel a duty 
to act responsibly by influencing the health behavior of partners 
or other family members (d’Agincourt-Canning, 2001; Hallowell 
et  al., 2002). In these cases, affective reactions toward children 
and the wider family are linked with and potentially caused by a 
conscious or unconscious endorsement of a specific social iden-
tity. Such endorsements present themselves, for example, when 
those affected make distinctions about their obligations to inform 
at-risk relatives that depend on the kind of relationship they feel 
they have with them.
Categories of GR Studies
Thematic, narrative analysis of the corpus allowed us to detect 
four major categories of studies that differed with regard to the 
type of agent of responsibility. This distinction reflects the finding 
that conceptualizations of GR generally differed primarily with 
respect to the agents and objects of responsibility. The agents of 
responsibility are those who make decisions related to GI and 
act upon them by targeting an object, i.e., themselves or another 
person (cf. Part 1: General Description of the Literature Corpus)]. 
We have classified the literature corpus into
(A) studies focusing on the responsibility for action based on 
knowledge of one’s own genetic condition;
(B) studies addressing the responsibilities of (potentially) 
affected people in the context of family;
(C) studies focusing on the responsibilities of healthcare profes-
sionals in genetic clinics and laboratories; and
(D) studies focusing on the responsibilities of institutions such 
as health insurance companies and the state.
In the 62 studies classified as (A) or (B), the agents were the 
affected or at-risk individuals. By affected we mean that they 
wanted to undergo or had already undergone GT for themselves 
to learn about their genetic conditions and/or were seeking 
information about the genetic risks of their (unborn) children. 
Some studies reflected explicitly how GI has sparked a new form 
of “being affected”6, for instance by detecting carriers for reces-
sive genetic disorders (Reed, 2009; Atkin et al., 2015; Hoeltje and 
Liebsch, 2015).
The studies revealed a broad spectrum of agents as the objects 
of responsibility, ranging from the individual him/herself to the 
offspring of the individual, a distant relative and society at large. 
Studies in which the agent (the acting person) and the object 
of responsibility were identical (“self-responsibility”) (n =  3) 
were grouped as type (A). Studies in which the agent was not 
identical to the object of responsibility (n = 59) were grouped as 
type (B) (responsibility for others) (cf. Figure 4). Studies on the 
responsibilities of the affected people in a family context formed 
by far the largest group (B) in our literature corpus. To make 
our results more accessible, we subdivided this large group 
into four thematic subcategories: decision making for personal 
GT (B1), disclosure of genetic risk (B2), decision making and 
disclosure intertwined (B3), and GT in reproductive decision 
making (B4). The “objects” of responsible action in all these 
studies were potentially at-risk children, relatives, and next of 
kin,7 whereas the moral norms most often referred to were the 
obligation to promote the welfare of relatives and next of kin 
and the obligation to respect their autonomy if they preferred 
not to know about the potential risk or were unable to handle 
this information. However, the subgroup B4 (n = 11) differed 
from the other three subgroups in two important respects: first, 
the agents of GR in studies focusing on the context of reproduc-
tion were primarily women or couples with a family history 
of genetic diseases or with a proven genetic risk of having 
children with a genetic illness. Second, the studies in subgroup 
B4 only involved communication of genetic risks between the 
future parents of a child or between the parents and a genetic 
counselor and focused exclusively on parental responsibilities 
toward the embryo.
In the 11 studies comprising group C, the agents were health-
care professionals working in the context of GT: genetic coun-
selors, physicians, nurses or geneticists, and laboratory workers 
performing genetic tests. In group D, only two cases, institutions 
such as a state legislative (Bickerstaff et  al., 2008) or insurance 
companies (van Hoyweghen et al., 2006), acted as agents of GR.
In all thematic categories, usage of the rational/principle-
oriented or affective/relational concepts of GR was identified (see 
also Figure 4); these are discussed in the following sections.
6 for a general discussion of the term, cf. Schicktanz et al. (2008).
7 We have distinguished between “relatives” and “next of kin.” The first includes 
not only people who are genetically related but also those who are affected by the 
GI who do not share the ancestry relevant for the genetic risk, such as partners or 
spouses or the family of the spouse.
FigUre 4 | relations between agents and objects of genetic responsibility and distribution of conceptual use of genetic responsibility. The left 
column and mid-column show agents and objects of responsibility and the thematic focus of the studies dealing with them, including the number of studies for each 
category. Right column shows the relative distribution of conceptual use of genetic responsibility in each category: a = rational/principle-oriented type, b = affective/
relational type, and c = reactive type.
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GR for Agency as a Form of Self-Responsibility (A)
An affected or at-risk person, who is acting in favor of their 
own health interests by taking knowledge of their own genetic 
condition as a reason, can be described as displaying GR for 
agency. This form of GR represents a rather general approach to 
responsibility in the context of the “new genetics.” Although it is 
frequently evoked in theoretical approaches to GR (Fletcher, 1974; 
Novas and Rose, 2000; Lemke, 2006; Buchanan et al., 2007), it was 
found in only three studies (code A) (Kerr et al., 1998; Shipman 
et al., 2013; Meisel and Wardle, 2014). Moreover, this concept is 
exceptional insofar as the agent and object of responsibility are 
identical. To possess agency in the context of GI means to be 
the cause of the actions taken with regard to that information. 
Therefore, GR for agency presupposes an autonomous agent who 
is capable of choosing which GI she wants to obtain, of guiding 
her own actions, and of setting self-chosen goals and life-plans 
according to this information.
Framed by a genetic condition, GI is construed as an appeal. 
The subject is called upon—be it internally by her conscience 
or externally through social expectations—to acknowledge her 
genetic condition and to act on this knowledge. However, given 
the huge gap between prediction and diagnosis on the one side 
and therapy or effective prevention on the other, the meaning 
of being genetically responsible for agency is ambivalent. If the 
agent cannot control her genetic predispositions anyway, what 
does it mean for her to act responsibly with regard to her knowl-
edge about these predispositions? Hence, acting includes forms 
of discursive strategies such as “blaming” or “actively ignoring” 
or practical strategies involving life-style changes, increased 
healthcare checks, or application of selective technologies such 
as abortion or embryo selection in cases of reproductive decision 
making.
Conceptualizations of GR centering around the pattern of 
“responsibility for agency” were used in the three studies to ques-
tion whether and to which extent the perception of the ability 
to make decisions and to act changed with the accessibility of 
GI. They also pertained to the question of whether increasing 
knowledge of GI is perceived as a means for improving decision 
making or rather as a reason for fatalism with regard to one’s own 
future conditions (Shipman et al., 2013; Meisel and Wardle, 2014). 
For example, Meisel and Wardle found that receiving genetic test 
results for a multifactorial condition such as obesity enforced 
narratives of personal responsibility for weight gain. Individuals 
who tested positively for a genetic predisposition to weight gain 
had a tendency to interpret this information as confirming the 
need to actively control their eating behavior. Meisel and Wardle 
(2014) concluded that:
Acknowledging an underlying genetic contribution to 
the susceptibility to weight gain by offering genetic 
testing may relieve some of the stigma, guilt and 
self-blame attached to problems with weight control. 
The  ‘scientifically objective’ personal result appeared 
to enable some people to recognize that they are ‘bat-
tling against their biology.’ Viewing problems with 
eating behavior as a ‘condition’ and not a personal 
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shortcoming appeared to increase confidence about 
managing and overcoming weight problems [Meisel 
and Wardle, 2014, (p. 183)].
In contrast, another study found that, in cases of GT of tumor 
tissues for Lynch syndrome diagnostics, those affected did not 
reflect on (and often did not understand) the implications of 
the genetic knowledge that would come with testing (Shipman 
et al., 2013). As a consequence, they did not make any considered 
choices for managing their condition. Instead they gave accounts 
of their responsibility with respect to tumor GT only after being 
subtly directed to the issue by the interviewer and, even then, 
they still tended to justify their inactivity in gathering knowledge 
and giving consent for the testing procedure by either refram-
ing or downplaying their role in the actions taken. Hence, the 
interviewees did not show any responsibility for the issue, even 
though the outcome of the testing could have had a significant 
impact on their lives. Shipman et al. (2013) identified two alterna-
tive rhetorical strategies used by the participants to justify their 
inactivity to the interviewer:
Generalised responsibility is commonly other-oriented 
and involves strategies that excuse a lack of knowledge 
or understanding of tumor testing by reframing consent 
as a hypothetical moral orientation […], civic duty […], 
and ‘blanket consent’ […]. Strategies that performed 
diminished responsibility were self-oriented and 
justified a lack of knowledge about tumor testing and 
consent by downgrading its significance […] [Shipman 
et al., 2013, (p. 238)].
In the latter study (Shipman et al., 2013), GR for agency was 
presented as a form of “reactive” moral responsibility aimed 
against the interviewer’s subtle expectation that the participant 
would make considered choices. Instead in the former study 
(Meisel and Wardle, 2014), GR for agency was more a case of 
rational moral responsibility. Here, even when results of GT con-
firmed a genetic predisposition to obesity, the affected people still 
considered themselves responsible for the maintenance of their 
health by controlling their eating behavior. According to Meisel 
and Wardle (2014), this could be explained by the prevailing 
moral norm in Western societies that health maintenance should 
be an individual task.
Hence, the exceptional case of responsibility for agency 
encompasses both moral stances of GR. By focusing on strategies 
applied to deny responsibility for action rather than an opposing 
strategy, the study by Shipman et al. represents reactions toward 
a feeling of being called on to act by a very local social norm. The 
interviewee apparently felt an obligation to meet the expectation 
of the interviewer. This expectation, however, did not presuppose 
responsibility for a general and widely accepted social norm such 
as “health maintenance is the responsibility of the individual,” 
but the assumption that GT results represent an important moral 
issue for concern and reflection. This shows that the normative 
uses of the term GR are independent of its agents and that a 
person can be understood to be self-responsible in a rational/
principle-oriented sense and in a reactive sense.
Both approaches have in common that the primary focus 
was the subject’s capacity to act and choose for herself. This was 
highlighted in a focus group study (Kerr et al., 1998), in which 
laypeople were asked to discuss the current and purported future 
practice of GT. The study reported that laypeople typically stressed 
the importance of autonomous decision making regarding GT, 
implying the need to take responsibility for the consequences 
of one’s individual choices. On the other hand, these laypersons 
struggled with the relevance and validity of the social and moral 
constraints. The discussions revealed that the simplistic impera-
tive for taking responsibility by making autonomous choices 
is often undermined by doubts about the actual capacities and 
possibilities of acting autonomously. For example, the authors 
observed that “[…] individual choice was clearly valued, but 
not uncritically, because there was a recognition of the social 
pressures that compromise an individual’s autonomy. In general, 
participants’ accounts of the choices with which clients of genetic 
testing are faced involved such sophisticated discussion. Several 
groups talked about cultural difference and the normative nature 
of our value judgments about medical and behavioral charac-
teristics […]” [Kerr et  al., 1998, (p. 120)]. This highlights that 
self-responsible choices can be shaped by responsibilities toward 
various cultural, social, and moral norms.
In summary, evoking self-responsibility by GI is yet a rarely 
addressed topic in qualitative studies, but occurs in contexts of 
where the lifestyle of an individual is already socially accepted as 
causality for bad health.
GR of At-Risk People in the Context of the Family (B)
The thematic framework of GR in the context of the fam-
ily differed from the previous framework with regard to the 
objects and norms of responsible behavior. Here, the self was 
only one possible object of responsibility,8 and the use of GR 
usually lacked a strong appellative character. Likewise, the 
norms to which agents were expected to be responsible were 
more concrete and other oriented and included “respect for 
autonomy,” “the duty not to harm others,” and “contributing 
to the wellbeing of future descendants.”9 These other-oriented 
norms informed the variety of GR in four ways. First, there 
were the studies (group B1) that addressed GR by examin-
ing individual decision-making processes with respect to GT 
(n  =  15). These studies focused primarily on the perceived 
other-oriented responsibilities of the affected individuals who 
were currently facing a genetic test or who had faced the decision 
to undergo GT in the past. A second group of studies (B2) 
(n  =  22) focused on the process of communicating genetic 
risks to relatives and next of kin. Third, the studies in group 
B3 (n = 11) presented both issues together. In this latter group 
of studies, experiencing the situation of facing a decision to 
8 Transmitting genetic risk information responsibly can theoretically involve a feel-
ing of obligations toward oneself, such as resisting familial pressures to disclose 
information or preventing harm to oneself, which might otherwise be caused by 
the reactions of others to the disclosed information. In practice, however, the self 
is rarely seen as the object of responsible agency in the context of informational 
genetic responsibility.
9 These other-oriented norms were obviously drawn from a Western or European 
cultural context. This reflects the structure of our literature sample.
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undergo GT was often associated with considerations about the 
responsibility of (not) disclosing genetic risks to others. Finally, 
studies referring exclusively to the context of reproductive 
decision making, such as carrier testing, prenatal diagnostics 
of the fetus, or preimplantation screening of the embryo, were 
included in group B4 (n =  11).
Decision Making (B1). Studies in group B1 referred to both 
rational/principle-oriented and affective/relational approaches 
to GR. The studies related to the experiences of the participants 
on receiving test results and the ways in which receiving the 
GI affected the perceived responsibilities of those interviewed 
toward others and their reliance on moral and local social norms.
In the rational/principle-oriented approach (code B1a), GR 
was associated with familiar moral norms such as not harming 
one’s children or society’s “gene pool,” and the need to comply 
with these norms or the failure to do so was framed as a burden 
in these studies (Taylor, 2004; Meiser et  al., 2005; O’Doherty, 
2009; Smith et  al., 2013). For example, Smith et  al. used the 
term “responsibility” to describe the frequent motivation 
of the participants to do “the right thing for one’s children’s 
reproductive decision-making (p. 418)” in GT for HD. For the 
affected individuals, testing became an issue of moral delibera-
tion involving the norms of not harming offspring and respect 
for autonomy. Moral reasoning also played a role in decision 
making in less well-understood hereditary dispositions, such as 
bipolar disorder. Meiser et al. (2005) reported that participants 
tended to believe that a genetic explanation would alleviate their 
personal responsibility for the condition as it reduces the stigma 
of personal failure. The study by Taylor (2004) is particularly 
noteworthy because it frames GR toward others as a moral 
responsibility for the well-being not only of family members but 
also of others (or society at large).
In contrast to these prospective, future-oriented actions, GR 
for close others also occurred retrospectively in some studies 
(Bostrom and Ahlstrom, 2005; Steinberg et al., 2007; Lehmann 
et  al., 2011). In these cases, blaming and feelings of guilt were 
associated not only with the parental duty to prevent harm but 
also with interviewees’ previous decisions to reproduce.
The ways in which moral responsibilities to the family 
form the moral justifications of individuals seem, however, to 
vary depending on the disease context. Hallowell (1999), in 
discussing women’s decisions to undergo GT for HBOC, sug-
gested that responsibilities toward family members interfere 
with individual choice and agency. Observations from several 
genetic counseling sessions revealed that, besides the rational/
principle-oriented moral decision making and the partly 
biased information provided by the counselor, the obligation 
to respect the autonomy of the next of kin and their right (not) 
to know often constrained the personal interests of those being 
counseled. In accordance with this, Smart (2010) reported 
that moral responsibilities toward the family often provide 
motivation for the affected persons to undergo GT for long QT 
cardiomyopathies, a set of multifactorial conditions where test 
results are highly uncertain.
We found the use of affective/relational concepts of GR in only 
a small number of studies on decision-making processes (n = 6; 
code B1b). One very prominent example was the study by Boenink 
(2011) showing that expectations about the participant’s family 
relationships that were implicit in the testing procedure signifi-
cantly influenced the outcomes of the tests. This may be explained 
by the fact that in the Netherlands, the protocols for the testing 
procedure imply that the participants live in familial settings 
that allow them to involve their family in the decision-making 
process, whereas procedures in the United States assume a much 
less socially embedded individual. Hence, differing structural 
expectations shape the strength of other-oriented responsibilities, 
as perceived by the test participants. Social roles and identities 
were also emphasized in several studies, which concentrated on 
the perceived responsibilities of individuals within their personal 
family relationships (Burgess and d’Agincourt-Canning, 2001; 
d’Agincourt-Canning, 2001, 2006; Hallowell et  al., 2002, 2006; 
Etchegary, 2006; Felt and Müller, 2011; Etchegary et  al., 2015). 
Challenging the claim that taking a genetic test is an issue of 
independent deliberation and choice, Etchegary (2006) writes:
Clinical guidelines for offering the genetic test for 
HD stress autonomy in decision-making, and genetic 
counseling embraces the principle of autonomy 
[…]. Yet, narratives of constrained decisions make 
it difficult to maintain seriously that test decisions 
are purely rational—self-interested, self-directed, 
and proceeding in a cost-benefit analysis. Rather, 
test decisions are taken in the context of one’s family 
[Etchegary (2006), p. 65].
The obligations to others were perceived as inherent in one’s 
role in the family. d’Agincourt-Canning made this clear in a study 
investigating women’s decision-making procedures for undergo-
ing GT for HBOC. Here, gender (among other features such as 
embodiment, family relationships, and civic self-understanding) 
intersected with social obligations insofar as being a gendered 
person implies specific role-related responsibilities for the well-
being and health of the kin (d’Agincourt-Canning, 2006), a point 
we also make in the context of reproductive decision making (cf. 
below). Decisions (not) to undergo GT were, thus, shaped by 
the roles and contextual self-understandings of the people to be 
tested. This was also observed when considering the motivations 
of women undergoing GT for HBOC. As Hallowell et al. (2002) 
reported, altruism and the facilitation of risk management for 
other family members were important motivators. This reflected 
a specific other-oriented approach to responsibility for women, 
which was often implied by their familial position. A good for-
mulation of this kind of affective/relational GR was expressed in 
a study by Manuel and Brunger (2014) on GT for ARVC “[…] 
relational responsibility reinforces that individual choices are 
socially embedded within the nexus of our social relationships 
and the meanings that we assign to these interactions. It also reaf-
firms that decisions about genetic testing do not happen in silo 
but are discussed amongst family members, particularly between 
spouses” (p. 1050).
Similar considerations were also raised by Raz et  al. (2014) 
in an Israeli-German study, who framed their responsibilities 
toward their future children as motivation for having a genetic 
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test: “lt was common amongst Israeli respondents, but not 
German respondents, to speak about their motivation for tak-
ing the HD test in the context of their children, as one Israeli 
respondent summarised it: ‘[Taking the test] is my responsibility 
as a mother’” [Raz et al. (2014), p. 187].
In sum, a common understanding of hereditary conditions 
provokes a meaning of GR as family decision making and by this 
enlarges the radius of action from the individual to his/her family.
Disclosure (B2). Generally, explicit notions of GR in the context 
of family communication and disclosure occurred frequently in 
the qualitative literature (n = 22). To be responsible with regard 
to disclosure of GI was usually taken to mean acting sensibly with 
regard to the effects this information might have on children, 
relatives, and next of kin. Gaff et al. (2005) gave a comprehensive 
definition of GR in the disclosure context:
Taking responsibility for transmitting information 
implies acting responsibly towards fellow family 
members. To act responsibly is to assess the potential 
consequence of sharing or withholding information 
and is embedded in a moral economy consisting of 
(mutual) assessments of competence and maturity, 
as exemplified by the deliberative communication 
strategy. Communication of genetic risk information is 
the result of intricate, existing ties of differing strengths 
[Gaff et al. (2005), p. 1003].
In line with this definition, studies in the B2 group frequently 
investigated the different strategies of communicating, transmit-
ting, and managing genetic risk information in a very close social 
context.
In the given context of disclosure, GR was predominantly 
construed as a form of affective/relational responsibility (n = 13, 
code B2b) and, slightly less often, as a rational/principle-oriented 
responsibility (n = 9). Among these rational/principle-oriented 
approaches, we found descriptions of GR according to the 
“standard” subtype (n =  5, code B2a) and the “non-standard,” 
reactive subtype (n = 4, code B2c). These patterns are discussed 
in this section, starting with the prevailing affective/relational 
responsibility framework.
The affective/relational approach to GR first appeared in 
studies with a feminist theoretical background that focused 
on women at risk for HBOC. However, studies using other 
theoretical backgrounds, such as the sociology of science (Felt 
and Müller, 2011), and other genetic conditions as models, such 
as HD (Etchegary and Fowler, 2008) or blood clotting predis-
position (Parrott et  al., 2015), also confirmed this approach. 
Dancyger et al. (2010) exposed an understanding of an affective/
relational informational approach to responsibility when they 
wrote:
All ‘committed’ family groups described their primary 
motivations for testing as arising from an obligation to 
others, while also acknowledging some, but less strong, 
motivations to be tested for their own benefit. […]. 
This obligation to others can be considered in terms of 
genetic responsibility: to do what is morally right for the 
family [Dancyger et al. (2010), p. 1294].
Some studies considered familial roles other than that of 
women managing health in the family, such as those of male 
partners and fathers (Hallowell et al., 2006) or those of parents 
toward children (Forrest et al., 2003; Arribas-Ayllon et al., 2008b; 
Manuel and Brunger, 2014; Vavolizza et  al., 2015) or of adults 
toward distant relatives (Etchegary and Fowler, 2008; Etchegary 
et al., 2009).
The application of an affective/relational approach to GR in the 
disclosure context also involved the description of constraints and 
facilitators with respect to family communication. Several studies 
stressed that transmission of genetic risk information depends 
on a variety of individual, social, and situational factors (Forrest 
et al., 2003; Gaff et al., 2005; Keenan et al., 2005; Mesters et al., 
2005; Ratnayake et al., 2011). “Feelings” of being responsible for 
the well-being of others or even anticipated feelings of regret for 
causing harm were strong facilitators for disclosure. The severity 
of the genetic condition also motivated sharing the information. 
Disrupted or overly tense family relationships, on the other hand, 
were barriers for disclosure. Studies generally reported that the 
affected people viewed disclosing genetic risk information as a 
great responsibility or even as a “burden” (Bonadona et al., 2002).
Besides gender and family roles (i.e., being a woman, being a 
parent, being part of the nuclear family) (d’Agincourt-Canning, 
2001; Mesters et al., 2005), the studies named the severity of the 
disease (Weiner, 2011), emotional ties between the informant and 
the hearer (Gaff et al., 2005; Carlsson and Nilbert, 2007), family 
dynamics (Forrest et al., 2003), and the spatial distance between 
the relatives (Etchegary and Fowler, 2008) as factors influencing 
bonding and responsibilities. Mostly, these bonds were also 
reported to influence the wish to balance other-oriented respon-
sibility and autonomy (Hallowell et al., 2003; Foster et al., 2004).
In some contexts, biological kinship can make a difference 
to the approach to responsibility with respect to disclosure. For 
example, a Turkish study by Akpinar and Ersoy (2014), which 
asked patients and physicians about their responsibilities in the 
process of disclosing genetic risks, revealed a difference in the 
ascription of responsibilities toward spouses and siblings. Only a 
few physicians and affected individuals saw it as the responsibility 
of the individual to inform a spouse, while there was strong con-
sensus that it was the affected individual’s responsibility to inform 
a sibling. This shows the importance of specific relationships for 
the perception and conception of GR.
A notable exception to this seeming pervasiveness of the 
affective/relational approach to GR was seen in a study by Weiner 
(2011). This study investigated responsibility in the context of 
familial hypercholesterolemia (FH), the symptoms of which can 
be controlled comparatively easily. The author reported that felt 
obligations to disclose the disease to children or next of kin were 
only of marginal importance to the affected individuals. This is 
surprising, because most forms of FH are caused by a dominant 
single gene mutation, with a 50% chance of inheritance. Obviously, 
the severity and treatability of a genetic disorder plays a major 
role in the felt obligations and responsibilities [cf. also Raz and 
Schicktanz (2009) and Boardman (2014b) for similar findings].
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The standard subtype of the rational/principle-oriented 
approach to GR was referred to when non-disclosure of genetic 
risk was discussed as a problem resulting from conflict between 
moral norms. Here, the conflicting norms were again “respect for 
autonomy” vs. “the obligation not to harm.” Respect for autonomy 
justified non-disclosure if the recipient did not want to know his 
genetic status. The “do-no-harm” principle was mostly used to 
justify an obligation to disclose GI in order to allow the recipients 
of the information to take action to prevent possible future harm 
caused by their genetic condition. It was, however, also used as 
an argument against disclosure, if the tested person concluded 
that the recipient needed to be protected from information with 
which she would be psychologically incapable of coping.
An early study adopting a standard view of rational/principle-
oriented responsibility based on the ethical dilemma between 
respect for one’s own interests and the no-harm principle was 
carried out by Hallowell (1999). The author reported that women 
affected by HBOC tended to relinquish their right not to know 
about their genetic makeup—sometimes to the extent that they 
seemed to dispense with their respect for their own autonomy 
in favor of the effect that others were not harmed—because of 
perceiving a strong moral obligation to disclose genetic risk 
information to reduce harm. This view about moral obligations 
toward others was not restricted to women at risk for HBOC. As 
Vavolizza et al. (2015) reported for the case of cardiac arrhyth-
mias leading to unexpected death, disclosure was perceived as a 
moral obligation by the affected people in the majority of cases. 
This obligation seemed the stronger, the more pressing, the more 
severe and uncontrollable the consequences of the genetic condi-
tion were. For cardiac arrhythmias, which cause no pain and are 
usually only discovered after a death in the family, disclosure was 
widely acknowledged as a moral obligation. Where consequences 
seemed more controllable and not necessarily fatal, the obligation 
was thought to be weaker. For instance, Dancyger et al. (2011) 
reported that information was edited or withheld in HBOC fami-
lies if those who were tested considered the recipient’s capacity to 
cope with the information as diminished.
Finally, four studies (Hallowell et  al., 2006; Arribas-Ayllon 
et al., 2008a,b, 2011) analyzed GR by focusing on communicative 
strategies during interviews and counseling sessions, drawing 
on the “reactive” subtype of the rational/principle-oriented 
approach to GR. This notion was particularly noteworthy in the 
work by Arribas-Ayllon et al. (2008a,b, 2009, 2011). These studies 
described a variety of rhetorical strategies used by the interview-
ees to argue that their behavior was genetically responsible in 
family negotiations. Despite not having disclosed genetic risk, 
affected or at-risk individuals used blaming others or themselves 
to appear responsible. These accounts of GR are interpreted as 
resistance against a common sense moral framework that framed 
only well-considered and autonomous management of genetic 
risk information as responsible behavior (Arribas-Ayllon et al., 
2011). The authors did not interpret feelings of guilt and blame 
as signifying responsibility but rather as artifacts evoked by the 
interview situation. By giving accounts of GR in terms of feelings 
of guilt, interviewees were reacting to a dominant moral frame-
work underlying the social discourse about GT. In line with the 
sociological analyzes by Novas and Rose (2000), taking individual 
responsibility for the management of genetic risk was morally 
required. Drawing on this framework, the authors concluded 
that non-disclosure of genetic risk to family members and the 
associated affect of guilt must be interpreted as expressions of the 
“obligation to manage GI.” This means that the concept of GR in 
these studies was very similar to the concept in group A studies. 
This is not because responsibility would be necessarily directed to 
the self as the object, but rather because accounts of responsibility 
expressed the feeling of being called to engage in the management 
of genetic risk. The following quote from Arribas-Ayllon et  al. 
(2011) illustrates this idea.
[…] not speaking or sharing the truth of genetic risk is 
itself a form of expression not captured by structures of 
signification. Nevertheless, non-disclosure warrants an 
account because our participants implicitly recognised 
that they live in a moral order where genetic risk should 
be communicated to kin. And yet, the explanations they 
gave for this were redundant forms of moral communi-
cation (that is, post-hoc justifications and excuses). […] 
we suggest that people resist the onerous obligation of 
managing genetic risk and disclosing bad news to kin to 
escape the moral/discursive confinement of autonomy 
[Arribas-Ayllon et al. (2011), p. 19].
Overall, disclosure was not solely seen as an implication of GR. 
Some cases also revealed a complex form of non-disclosure as a 
moral implication of GR. However, the justification of whether 
to share or to hide GI was based on underlying moral principles 
(e.g., autonomy) and their concrete interpretation with respect to 
the family situation or illness.
Decision Making and Disclosure Intertwined (B3). Some stud-
ies (n =  11, code B3) revealed that, from an affected person’s 
point of view, the decision for a test and the disclosure of GI were 
inextricably related to each other (Burgess, 1994; Bostrom and 
Ahlstrom, 2005; Etchegary and Fowler, 2008; Etchegary et  al., 
2009; Raz and Schicktanz, 2009; Dancyger et  al., 2010; Smart, 
2010; Vears et al., 2015). This approach was, however, often indi-
rect, as studies often focused on the psychological and social 
changes in an individual resulting from the disclosure of a test 
result. With respect to responsibility, the changes in the tested 
person’s perceptions of their moral obligations toward others are 
of interest. Changes of this kind were, for example, reported from 
a study using hereditary epilepsy predisposition as a model (Vears 
et al., 2015). The study showed that receiving a positive test result 
affected the perceived moral responsibilities toward others in 
various possible ways:
Interestingly, some parents felt identification of the 
causative gene meant the responsibility of passing 
on the epilepsy had been removed. Yet other parents 
were grateful the genetic information had not been 
available when they were having children, removing 
the need for decision-making in family planning […]. 
Feelings of ‘genetic responsibility’ were expressed by 
some of our participants, who described a desire to 
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prevent epilepsy in future generations […]. Some fam-
ily members were apprehensive for those who had had 
children despite the risk of passing on epilepsy [Vears 
et al. (2015), p. 69].
Other studies noted a conflict between self-responsibility for 
health and the responsibility to disclose genetic risk to the next 
of kin. While in Western societies the individual is considered 
obliged to make decisions with regard to her body and health—
such as the decision to undergo GT or not, knowing one’s genetic 
status is perceived as implying the responsibility for disclosing 
genetic risk information to prevent potential harm to others. In 
a comparative analysis of affected individuals’ and laypeople’s 
attitudes toward GT in Israel and Germany (Raz and Schicktanz, 
2009) revealed this conflict between the self-responsibility of 
knowing one’s genetic status and the responsibility toward others 
that comes with this knowledge:
The moral conflict was described as consisting of, on 
the one hand, the moral responsibility towards kin, but 
on the other hand the recognition that how to handle 
such information is a genuinely individual decision – 
especially about health and the body, which everybody 
has to care for on their own [Raz and Schicktanz (2009), 
p. 437–438].
However, depending on the disease context, the decision to 
have GT did not necessarily conflict with the responsibility for 
disclosing the genetic risk. As Dancyger et al. (2010) observed, the 
expectation of disclosure of genetic risk information to the next 
of kin, in order to take responsibility for their health behavior, 
sometimes motivated the decision to have GT in the first place. 
This was particularly true for mothers at risk for HBOC, who 
perceived their daughters’ future options in healthcare decision 
making as a reason to have GT: “She told her daughters about 
her mutation the day she received her result and was keen for 
her daughters to ‘get on with it’ and be tested themselves. One 
daughter was aware of her mother’s motivation for testing and 
interpreted her communication about the test result and genetic 
risk as nagging” [Dancyger et al. (2010), p. 1291].
This mother clearly expressed a rational/principle-oriented 
approach to the responsibility to have GT and to disclose the 
test result, motivated by her perceived obligation to reduce harm 
for her daughters. At the same time, one might argue that she 
disrespected her daughters’ right to decide whether they wanted 
to know this information. Responsibility for others played a 
significant role in the motivation to have GT, especially for 
preventable or treatable diseases. In particular, if the testees 
were already affected by the disease, the decision to have a test to 
determine whether the disease was heritable was shaped by the 
expectation that the result would be disclosed to help the next 
of kin. As Etchegary et al. (2009) reported in a study on GT for 
HBOC and HNPPC:
Study participants described their responsibility to their 
families particularly children to provide risk informa-
tion that could be used in cancer-risk management 
decisions. […] Indeed, many suggested the primary 
motivation for testing was for relatives, more than for 
themselves [Etchegary et al. (2009), p. 259].
In contrast to the case in Dancyger et al. (2010), the authors 
were referring to an affective/relational understanding of GR. The 
decision to take the test was interpreted as suggesting that “some 
people at risk for inherited cancer did not construct as independ-
ent, making choices that only affected themselves. Rather, in 
decisions about inherited cancer risk the self was constructed 
as interdependent” [Etchegary et  al. (2009), p. 259]. Here, the 
obligations appeared to be localized in the specific context of 
the family and were not framed as a general moral obligation 
to disclose the genetic risk. Such localized responsibilities may 
affect the testing decision in the opposite way. As d’Agincourt-
Canning (2006) reported, declining a test can be motivated by 
felt responsibilities toward others, as well, when disclosure of 
genetic risk status to kin might be considered to be doing more 
harm than good.
It was an important point of many qualitative studies on GT 
that local, affective/relational responsibilities undermined the 
picture of the autonomous agent underlying the ethical princi-
ples prevailing in counseling guidelines for GT (Hallowell et al., 
2003; Etchegary and Fowler, 2008). This point was displayed in 
an extreme way in a study by Foster et al. (2002), who discussed 
a case in which affective/relational responsibility for taking a 
genetic test expressed as the wish “to keep everybody else happy” 
(p. 479) was not primarily perceived as a responsibility toward 
family and kin, but as a reaction to the physician’s invitation to 
take the test.
From an intercultural perspective, few studies reported 
differences in the responsibilities perceived between different 
Western societies (Raz and Schicktanz, 2009; Raz et al., 2014). 
While Miller et al. (2014) observed an acknowledgment of the 
importance of disclosing genetic risk information in interviews 
with Westerners about genomic sequencing for late-stage cancer 
care, disclosing GI to the wider family was perceived as less 
morally important in some groups with a non-western cultural 
background. Similarly, Shaw and Hurst (2009) reported that 
disclosing genetic risk to the wider family was not perceived as a 
moral responsibility in Pakistani communities in Great Britain. 
Rather the information was understood as belonging exclusively 
to the couple or the tested person.
In sum, moral conflicts occurred regularly on two levels of 
decision making: first whether and when to make a GT and after-
ward, whether and when to disclose/not to disclose the results of 
such a GT within the family.
Reproductive GR (B4). Studies discussing GR mainly in the con-
text of reproduction involved GT for hereditary diseases of the 
fetus or embryo, carrier testing, and prenatal blood screening for 
genetic anomalies of the fetus. The concept of GR in this respect 
differed from the situations above in that it focused neither on 
the self-agency nor on communication, but on the decision to 
have children or the decision to have GT during pregnancy or 
to select embryos by preimplantation genetic diagnosis before 
the pregnancy. Importantly, the studies in our data set differed 
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 significantly from the theoretical approach to reproductive GR of 
the 1970 s and classical eugenics (Lipkin and Rowley, 1974). None 
of these studies suggested “classical eugenics,” conceptualizing 
genetically responsible reproductive behavior as decision mak-
ing in favor of optimizing the gene pool of society or a population.
As Hoeltje and Liebsch (2015) argued in their German 
interview study with those affected in the context of CF, this 
“new” paradigm of GR stands in contrast to classical eugenics 
as an imperative for those affected to self-determinedly “select” 
and understand their decision as an individual choice [cf. also 
Habermas (2005)]. Rather than the imperative to impact a popu-
lations’ gene pool, it is to avoid individual suffering. However, as 
the authors concluded, the result might be the same.
Therefore, the studies focused on private reproductive deci-
sions, which were guided by different individual norms. The 
decisions and actions described were more negative-selective 
(e.g., deciding for abortion or for relinquishment) than positive-
selective (e.g., actively choosing one’s children’s genetic make-up). 
Some studies examined explicitly how these private decisions by 
the parents were influenced indirectly by public discourse and 
not—as in the case of classic eugenics—explicitly enforced by 
state authorities (Boardman, 2014b; Yau and Zayts, 2014; Hoeltje 
and Liebsch, 2015). Another group of studies focused on the role 
of “experienced knowledge” of the illness within the family and 
how this influenced reproductive decisions.
The studies in the field of reproductive GR fell into two sub-
categories: studies focusing on the process of making a decision 
about having a child if the risk of having a baby with a genetic 
disease was considerable (n = 7) (Downing, 2005; Dekeuwer 
and Bateman, 2013; Donnelly et al., 2013; Boardman, 2014a,b; 
Yau and Zayts, 2014; Hoeltje and Liebsch, 2015) and studies 
using gender as a category to investigate the role of future 
parents in the context of prenatal genetic screening procedures 
(n = 3) (van Berkel and Klinge, 1997; Reed, 2009; Atkin et al., 
2015). In addition, one study approached reproductive GR 
indirectly via the perceptions and opinions of genetic counse-
lors (Ekberg, 2007).
Similar to the context of disclosing genetic risk in the family, 
some studies focused on a rational/principle-oriented approach 
to responsibility (n = 6, code B4a) (Ekberg, 2007; Dekeuwer and 
Bateman, 2013; Donnelly et  al., 2013; Boardman, 2014a,b; Yau 
and Zayts, 2014) and some on an affective/relational approach 
(n = 5, code B4b) (van Berkel and Klinge, 1997; Downing, 2005; 
Reed, 2009; Atkin et al., 2015; Hoeltje and Liebsch, 2015).
The focus on GR in the rational/principle-oriented approach 
might have been invoked by the fact that, in many stud-
ies, parents or affected persons were interviewed about the 
hypothetical or rather abstract scenario of whether to test for 
a genetic disorder. This was ‘hypothetical’ insofar as most stud-
ies were not conducted within the setting for prenatal testing, 
but approached the affected people long before or after they 
made their reproductive decision. Two interview studies in the 
context of BRCA mutation revealed ‘a dual dimension’ to how 
women perceived it to be a moral dilemma when they were to 
be tested for their own health, but anticipated in advance that 
a positive result might negatively impact on their reproductive 
decisions later (Dekeuwer and Bateman, 2013; Donnelly et al., 
2013). Overall, they prioritized their own health; reproductive 
decisions were a less relevant motivation for GT. Receiving GI 
resulted in attempts to ‘manage’ the risk in various ways (closer 
surveillance, prophylactic mastectomy, or timing of conception 
in cases of radiochemotherapy). It was always deeply embedded 
in the lived experience of the disease and depended on whether 
the wish for their own children was made explicit before the 
testing (Dekeuwer and Bateman, 2013). Parental responsibility 
meant “to justify this choice [to have a child and to potentially 
transmit the BRCA mutation] to her children” [Dekeuwer and 
Bateman (2013), p. 240]. The non-standard reactive meaning 
of rational/principle-oriented GR occurred in the sense that 
the interviewees argued that they would be held accountable 
for decisions that affected themselves and their children. This 
dilemma could also be seen as a choice between two types of 
risk: the risk of knowing vs. the risk of occurrence (to have a 
child suffering from a disease). As an observational study in a 
genetic counseling setting in a Hong Kong hospital revealed, 
the risk of knowing was mainly put forward as an argument 
when clients wanted to signal their responsible accountability 
not to test (Yau and Zayts, 2014). A particular implication of 
reproductive GR was evoked in families with children who had 
a serious, untreatable recessive disease such as spinal muscular 
atrophy (Boardman, 2014b). In these families, the so-called 
expressive objection, a critique of GT saying that testing and 
abortion not only express a negative validation of the fetus tested 
but also of the lives of people living with the disability, framed 
the understanding of “responsibility.” The interviewees were 
aware of how their reproductive decision could be interpreted by 
others, especially by existing children with the disease. Hence, 
accountability for decisions taken became crucial, but depended 
on the social relationships in which the actors were embedded. 
Here, the notion of responsibility was associated with morally 
embedded relationships, in contrast to the idea of an indi-
vidualized agency or personal choice. Furthermore, stressing 
responsibility as increased awareness or practice of justification 
was supported by socioempirical findings that responsibility 
or related understandings were used for both, even contrary 
outcomes of decisions, namely, to test as well as not to test, to 
abort as well as not to abort.
The affective/relational approach to GR was, instead, one of 
the main motives in studies focusing on gender issues. Reed 
(2009) claimed it was the “gendered nature of genetic respon-
sibility (p. 343)” by which gender stereotypes formed expecta-
tions and performed in their parental roles as a mother or a 
father. In the context of reproduction, the idea of an embodied 
responsibility occurred as (essentialist) feelings of maternal 
responsibility for the well-being of the fetus (van Berkel and 
Klinge, 1997). However, when it came to high-risk screening 
results, women’s articulation of maternal responsibility varied in 
extent with respect to men’s involvement. If men were involved 
in carrier testing, women were more relaxed about their own 
responsibility. The study by Atkin et  al. (2015) also pointed to 
an increased masculine responsibility during carrier screening. 
Genetic screening provided men with a chance to feel bodily 
engaged and to demonstrate responsible “fatherhood.” Finally, 
one small but detailed case study by Downing (2005) on HD 
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families illustrated how responsibility was negotiated by family 
members independently of whether they accepted or rejected GT.
In summary, GR in the context of reproduction did not 
provide a simplistic model of eugenic attempts, but implied 
a complex process of moral interpretation and justification. 
Furthermore, the review has revealed that GR is associated 
with different outcomes of decisions, including opposing ones. 
However, only a few studies comprehensively explained their 
conceptual understanding of terms such as responsibility or GR 
(Downing, 2005; Reed, 2009; Hoeltje and Liebsch, 2015). Most 
seemed to assume what is meant by responsibility in the context 
of GT as self-evident.
Professional GR (C)
In the studies in group C, physicians, nurses, geneticists, and 
laboratory workers associated with performing the genetic tests 
were the agents of GR. These studies primarily investigated 
the roles and obligations of healthcare professionals in GT 
in general, as well as the obligations of genetic counselors to 
patients and their families. The norms of responsible behavior 
included respect for the autonomy of the counselee (expressed 
in an appeal not to direct their decision), the obligation to secure 
informed consent, and a duty to prevent harm to the counselee’s 
family members (sometimes against the will of the counselee). 
There were three subtypes in group C. Subgroup C1 comprised 
studies that investigated professional GR by directly drawing on 
the views of healthcare professionals about their daily work and 
practice in genetic counseling or GT (n = 5, code C1) (Arribas-
Ayllon et al., 2009; Bredenoord et al., 2010; Hines et al., 2010; 
Townsend et al., 2012; Hens et al., 2013). These studies investi-
gated the professionals’ subjective assessments of the distribu-
tion of responsibility in clinical practice. The second subgroup 
(C2) addressed professional GR indirectly via the expectations 
of people, who were genetically at risk, or unaffected people 
confronted with hypothetical ethical dilemmas (n = 3, code C2) 
(Burgess, 1994; Haga et al., 2012; Daack-Hirsch et al., 2013). The 
third subgroup (n =  3, code C3) approached professional GR 
from a third-party perspective using interview material with 
physicians involved in genetic medicine to describe paradigm 
shifts in genetic counseling that affected professional duties 
and responsibilities (Bogner, 2013), or to argue that healthcare 
professionals in genetics tended to refer to legal or profes-
sional regulations to escape confrontation with their personal 
responsibilities (Wieser, 2011; D’Audiffret Van Haecke and 
de Montgolfier, 2015). These studies did not directly address 
professional GR but indirectly drew conclusions about GR by 
describing and analyzing the subtext of interview material about 
physicians’ daily practice of genetic medicine.
The studies often took ethical dilemmas as a starting point to 
discuss professional responsibilities. In subgroup C1, professional 
GR was primarily construed as a form of rational/principle-
oriented responsibility. With respect to the management of the 
uncertainties implied in genetic test results, genetic counselors 
saw it as their responsibility to secure informed consent by provid-
ing as much relevant, balanced information as possible (Arribas-
Ayllon et al., 2009; Bredenoord et al., 2010; Hines et al., 2010), to 
protect the autonomy of the patient (Hines et al., 2010), and (if 
relevant) to prevent harm to the patient’s relatives by supporting 
or even intervening in disclosure to the family. As Bredenoord 
et al. (2010) put it with regard to the specific uncertainties of GT 
for mitochondrial DNA disorders, the moral impetus of securing 
informed, autonomous decision making is central to professional 
GR: “In our view, it belongs to the responsibility of professionals 
working in this field to try to help affected couples to make a well-
informed decision, even if this cannot always consist in providing 
them with precise data about remaining risks” [Bredenoord et al. 
(2010), p. 16].
Other responsibilities of healthcare professionals were 
more context dependent. Studies mentioned that healthcare 
professionals involved in genetics/genomics were also aware 
of being responsible for providing psychosocial support to 
patients (Hines et al., 2010), controlling uncertainties in testing 
of complex diseases by referring patients to more experienced 
colleagues (Bredenoord et  al., 2010) and actively supporting 
the patients’ reproductive decision making in terms of helping 
them to figure out the relevant factors and values involved in 
the decision (Hines et al., 2010). In cases involving the GT of 
underaged children, genetic professionals were also reported to 
be responsible for actively balancing the parents’ avoidance of 
responsibility not to cause harm to the children (Arribas-Ayllon 
et al., 2009). In all these context-dependent cases, however, pro-
fessional GR was also construed as a rational/principle-oriented 
concept.
Studies in subgroup C2 reported that, from the perspec-
tive of the counselees, the professional responsibilities of the 
genetic counselors and physicians sometimes extended further 
than believed by the genetic counselors and physicians them-
selves. For example, Haga et al. (2012) reported that laypeople 
expected professional geneticists not only to explain pharma-
cogenetic information in an understandable manner but also 
to manage the disclosure of ancillary genetic risk information. 
Daack-Hirsch et al. (2013) reported that, during whole-genome 
sequencing, laypersons attributed responsibility to the genetic 
counselor to disclose incidental findings and to suggest adequate 
follow-ups.
These expectations also indicate that professional GR is a 
form of rational/principle-oriented responsibility, because the 
underlying norm to which professionals are expected to conform 
is the protection of the patient’s autonomy and action with their 
consent. Patients expected to make their own choices but also 
expected professionals to disclose any GI that might be relevant 
for their decisions about how to act.
Two studies in subgroup C3 focused on the GR of profession-
als in relation to (novel) legal regulations associated with genetic 
counseling. A French study (D’Audiffret Van Haecke and de 
Montgolfier, 2015) used a rational/principle-oriented approach 
to professional GR. The authors observed that legislation requir-
ing genetic counselors to disclose the genetic risks associated 
with fatal genetic diseases to affected family members incited 
conflict between the counselor’s responsibilities to protect the 
patient and the patient’s next of kin and their responsibility to 
respect the interests of the healthcare system and society at large. 
The authors concluded that the new legislation brought about a 
situation where:
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We are at the crux of a debate opposing individual 
and collective responsibility, with the healthcare 
professional—as actor in disease prevention and in 
matters of public health—at the center, caught in the 
crossfire between acting in the interests of the general 
population and acting in the interests of their patient 
and family [D’Audiffret Van Haecke and de Montgolfier 
(2015), p. 10].
To handle this conflict, genetic counselors applied different 
strategies resulting in different outcomes with respect to their 
moral obligations. For example, in the same study, genetic 
counselors “recognize that the law gives them something to 
fall back on in ‘those rare cases’ where patients refuse to warn 
at-risk relatives (I1), to ‘counter refusals when the reasons are as 
much to do with family feuds, geographic separation, or fear of 
genetics and the allied denial as anything else’ (I7)” [D’Audiffret 
Van Haecke and de Montgolfier (2015), p. 6]. Other profession-
als “took the stance that there was no real need to legislate since 
informing patients of risks to relatives is part of professional 
duty, and developing disclosure support is part of professional 
practice (I2)” [D’Audiffret Van Haecke and de Montgolfier 
(2015), p. 6].
Non-performance of professional GR was also an important 
issue in an Austrian study, which found that reference to legal 
regulations or to the medical code of conduct served as a rhetori-
cal strategy for genetic professionals to repudiate GR in ethical 
dilemmas (Wieser, 2011). Hinting at the fact that genetic profes-
sionals, who are the experts for the issues under legal regulation, 
contributed to existing legal regulation and hence were at least 
partly responsible for it, the study revealed their denial of respon-
sibility as morally flawed:
The interviewees [medical geneticists] repeatedly drew 
on the law in order to convince the interviewer that 
ethical issues of genetic medicine were sufficiently 
cared for. […] Essentially, in such a way the inter-
viewed medical experts provided answers with reduced 
accountability [Wieser (2011), p. 178].
The only example of an affective/relational approach to 
GR was provided by a study focusing on a paradigm shift 
with respect to genetic counseling (Bogner, 2013). The study 
argued that the concept of genetic counseling had shifted from 
a paternalistic, knowledge-based approach to a participatory 
model. Instead of providing information, the new participatory 
approach implied that genetic counselors have responsibility 
for coaching the patient during her decision-making process. 
This shift could best be explained by the idea that the person 
at risk had to take increased individual responsibility for her 
health, while the genetic counselor’s responsibility was reduced 
to adhering to the moral ideal of “neutrality” and non-directive 
coaching.
In summary, professional GR was discussed mainly as com-
munity skill- and capacity-based awareness of professionals 
to be sensitive to the various moral dimensions and conflicts. 
It is embedded in a general understanding of an asymmetric 
professional-lay relationship where the asymmetry relies not only 
to factual knowledge but also to the social implications of sharing 
GI later on.
The GR of Institutions (D)
Only two papers (code D) discussed the GR of institutions (van 
Hoyweghen et al., 2006; Bickerstaff et al., 2008). van Hoyweghen 
et  al. (2006) analyzed processes of responsibilization in life 
insurance companies and their policies, showing how they 
constructed different notions of being at risk. While, from 
the institutional point of view, genetically at-risk people were 
identified as victims of circumstance who deserved solidarity 
or “collective responsibility” [van Hoyweghen et  al. (2006), p. 
1232], people with risky lifestyles and behaviors were identified 
as being responsible for their own health risks and were thus 
held accountable for themselves. According to the authors, life 
insurance companies functioned as a normative “technology 
and practice” that shaped ideas and notions of responsibility. 
Conversely, this implied the responsibilization of society in 
general as carers for genetically at-risk people who were found 
worthy of solidarity, while voluntary risk-takers were dismissed 
as being unworthy of solidarity. Thus, this article introduced 
two possible agents of responsibility: society or the insurance 
company as agent and the (explicitly non-genetic) lifestyle risk-
taking individual taking responsibility for his/her own actions, 
as opposed to the genetically at-risk individual who was not 
responsible for his/her condition.
Bickerstaff et  al. (2008) discussed GR in the context of 
citizens’ perceptions of “responsibility in relation to a number 
of risk issues” [Bickerstaff et al. (2008), p. 1312], of which GT 
was only one of six. Strikingly, laypeople participating in the 
study discussed an institutional responsibility for application 
of GT technologies. GR was described as a “responsibility for 
the management of environmental and technological risks” 
and was ascribed to institutional actors, such as “government” 
and “science,” because of their specific competence to resolve 
those issues. Hence, responsibility resulted from the institutions’ 
unique agency, i.e., “knowledge and power to take meaningful 
action” (all quotes p. 1321). In this model, society was the object 
of a social responsibility attributed to institutions that had a duty 
of care, deriving from their more or less exclusive abilities. It 
was noteworthy that this type of responsibility was not about 
genetic risk information as such, since the mentioned institu-
tions were concerned with creating and shaping regulatory 
frameworks of GT technology and its usage. They were, on a 
meta-level, responsible for the prevention of harm to individuals 
or to society that may occur as a result of the application of GT 
technologies.
Both papers framed the GR of institutions as a rational/
principle-oriented concept, since the agents were able to take 
on rational responsibility, basing their duty on their unique role 
as a factual authority that was trusted to fulfill its protective role 
toward individuals or society. Overall, the role of institutions 
was rarely addressed, but the few studies revealed the need for 
more comprehensive understanding of collective actions and 
collective responsibility in relation to GI.
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DiscUssiOn
Our findings revealed that, in empirical-qualitative studies, 
GR was seen as a subspecies of responsibility that was biased 
toward certain relata and conceptual dimensions. The basis of 
the GR concept was primarily the prospective responsibility 
of affected or at-risk individuals to their family and next of 
kin (including potential future children) but was also, albeit 
to a far lesser extent, the responsibilities of genetic counselors 
and medical doctors. Institutional responsibilities have been 
relatively neglected. The focus of the papers was primarily on 
the individual in their close, personal social environment. A 
wider social or political perspective was only visible in rare 
cases, where GR occurred as retrospective responsibility in 
a ‘reactive’ manner. This seemed to be the only context in 
which social norms and expectations beyond the individual 
family appeared on the conceptual horizon. Interestingly, 
this individualistic form of GR that we found in the mate-
rial confirmed a common pattern in the current sociological 
and bioethical discourse. The problem of how to use the 
increasing possibility of obtaining and managing GI has 
induced a shift in the medical sociological and bioethical 
literature on GT from an optimistic rhetoric of autonomy 
and choice toward a more pessimistic, critical approach. GR 
no longer only stands for the promotion of the well-being of 
future generations, but has more and more become a notion 
that reflects a major social trend toward a proliferation of 
responsibilities, amounting to a general responsibilization of 
the individual in questions of health. The term responsibiliza-
tion describes the phenomenon of the increasing transfer of 
responsibility for handling health risks from collective or 
institutional agents to the individual. In health care especially, 
with the new technologies and means for control, new risks 
and possibilities for acting are developing. In the process of 
responsibilization, individual agents are becoming the carriers 
of these new responsibilities (Ter Meulen and Jotterand, 2008; 
Young, 2011). In contrast to this mapping of the uses of GR 
in the qualitative research literature, this review also found 
an empirical and theoretical necessity to employ a more dif-
ferentiated notion of GR in current bioethical and biopolitical 
discourses. In fact, responsibilization was rarely discussed in 
the qualitative studies we reviewed.
Our results indicated that, in the qualitative medical sociol-
ogy literature, GR is a complex concept that is embedded in a 
web of dependencies, relationships, and expectations. GR can, 
hence, be approached from a variety of different angles. However, 
most studies in our corpus centered on the ascribed or projected 
responsibilities of at-risk or affected people and, therefore, 
favored a rather pragmatic approach to the ethics of GT. These 
responsibility ascriptions, however, varied in general terms along 
three major pathways.
First, there was a generalized assumption associated with GR 
that action should be taken with regard to the mere possibility 
of GI. These actions, however, should encompass various forms. 
Taking responsibility for one’s own health status seemed widely 
perceived as the responsibility of the affected individual, whereas 
the application of GT is continuously enlarging the spectrum of 
affected agents. Hence, the prospect of using GI to obtain guid-
ance for individual health maintenance has created a space for 
self-directed action. Other-oriented blame and self-justification 
by affected individuals who did not disclose GI, as observed by 
some studies, can be interpreted as a reaction to this general feel-
ing of being called to use the information for one’s own good, for 
the good of one’s kin, or even for society’s greater good. Because 
this responsibility is often not obvious or implicit, it was only 
very seldom directly revealed in interview studies but has instead 
appeared as part of the interpretation process. The apparent dif-
ficulties associated with showing this pervasive pattern directly 
by empirical investigation, however, lend doubt to the idea that 
an affected individual is able to consciously perceive these social 
constraints to their decision making or is aware of the social 
process of responsibilization.
Second, there were more mundane patterns to be seen in GR. 
We found both rational/principle-oriented and affective/rela-
tional approaches to GR in the context of the family with respect 
to GT. The quantitative prevalence of the affective/relational 
approach might be an effect of sociologists’ interest in social roles 
and their sensitivity to interpersonal dependencies, which can 
shape an agent’s responsibilities—a fact that is hardly discussed 
in bioethical or legal debates (Beier et al., 2016).
As supported by philosophical-theoretical approaches to 
responsibility (Hart, 1968; French, 1991; Yoder, 2002; Held, 2006; 
Young, 2011), these decisions were not undertaken by an autono-
mous deliberator, but were mutually shaped by social roles and 
expectations. However, the use of responsibility in many studies 
would benefit from more distinct reflections on the underlying 
relationships. The rational/principle-oriented concept of GR 
seemed, instead, to be used to describe conflicting obligations 
and processes of moral deliberation. Hence, insights into how 
laypeople address such moralities, and practical ways of naming 
the conflicts related to GT, would allow the underlying norms 
(such as a person’s autonomy, the duty not to harm, and others) 
to be delineated.
Third, the contexts of reproductive or institutional decision 
making were both susceptible to implied obligations to society—
whether now or in the future. This is not surprising, given the 
historical legacy of traditional eugenics which proposed a benefit 
for future society based on austerity of the individual. However, 
it is striking that most Anglo-American studies circumvented 
the context of eugenics and only one German and one German-
Israeli study referred to it explicitly.
Only a small number of studies construed GR as the respon-
sibility of genetic professionals. This is striking for two reasons. 
First, professional GR was almost exclusively construed as a 
rational/principle-oriented responsibility based on concrete 
professional norms like securing informed consent, respecting 
the client’s autonomous decision making and preventing harm. 
However, studies on professional GR rarely investigated the 
concrete implementation of these norms, which would require 
methodological access to the practice and critical reflection on 
it, instead using observation and critical communication studies. 
It would, for instance, be interesting to know how the charac-
terization of the responsibilities ascribed to (or self-ascribed by) 
genetic professionals maps on the current ideal of non-directive 
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genetic counseling as defined by the UNESCO (United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2004)10 It is 
probable that the praxis of professional GR, before individual 
autonomy and—as a consequence—non-directive counseling 
became the prevailing paradigm in applied medical genetics, did 
not look the same as it does today. Second, perspectives on profes-
sional GR often differed between patients and professionals. More 
generally, there seemed to be a gap between the professional’s 
perceived obligation to manage the conditions for informed and 
autonomous decision making by the patient and the patient’s 
expectation to feel and act according to their own responsibility. 
This calls for a reconsideration of the roles and obligations in 
the relationship between genetic counselor (or physician) and 
patient.
This is supported by the observation that some studies implied 
that the availability of genetic tests did not necessarily correlate 
with the increase in the perceived responsibilities of the affected 
individuals toward their family or next of kin (Weiner, 2011; 
Meisel and Wardle, 2014). It was less likely that a study reported 
feelings of responsibility toward others where the etiology of a 
disease was more complex, its probability of transmission into 
future generations was lower, and the possibilities of controlling 
the medical consequences of the health condition were better. 
Patients typically did not think that it would be irresponsible not 
to disclose genetic conditions that do not significantly differ from 
acquired forms of the disease in terms of clinical symptoms (e.g., 
FH or obesity) to other family members. The studies on these 
kinds of diseases undermined the idea that at least this form of 
GR is proliferating since the advent of GT.
Conversely, as the focus of qualitative empirical research 
on GT was mainly on interpersonal family relationships, the 
influences of the increased possibilities for GI were not clearly 
revealed on a broader social and institutional level. This was 
supported by the blatant underrepresentation of empirical 
studies focusing on institutional responsibilities. The role of 
institutions such as insurance companies, state legislation, 
and professional associations has been insufficiently examined 
empirically (Heyman and Henriksen, 2001; Bogner, 2005; 
Hashiloni-Dolev, 2007).11 The same holds for contexts beyond 
industrialized western countries. We find it concerning, for the 
further universalization of findings related to GR, that only a few 
studies attempted to reflect on the cultural and national situation 
of GT, counseling and healthcare provision (e.g., what is publicly 
funded or campaigned for) [cf. also Raz and Schicktanz (2009)]. 
There was a gap in the current literature on the ways that these 
discourses are shaped.
Our findings suggest that the socioempirical literature focused 
on the complexity of concrete practices and experiences of GT, 
10 For a recent discussion of this standard and its history, see also Louhiala and 
Launis (2013).
11 This observation is not true for studies examining professional attitudes toward 
“prenatal testing” (Heyman and Henriksen, 2001; Bogner, 2005; Hashiloni-Dolev, 
2007). However, as our search strategy focused on “genetic testing” we excluded 
studies mainly focusing on prenatal testing if “genetic testing” was not indicated in 
title, abstract, or keywords.
whereas the philosophical and ethical discourses about GT focus 
more on the liberal challenge whether and when to intervene 
legally in the GT practice (Chadwick et al., 2014). The diversity 
of interpretations of the concept of responsibility in relation to 
GI restricted the opportunity to develop general sociological 
hypotheses about its psychological and social consequences. This 
was particularly obvious in a clinical genetics context, on which 
the majority of studies were focused. In almost all studies, the 
relationships of responsibility in genetic medicine held between 
genetic professionals, at-risk individuals, and their next of kin. 
These responsibilities concerned the management of hereditary 
diseases with different hereditary and clinical properties, but 
seemed rather unrelated to concerns about the medicalization of 
harmless genetic aberrations, the general genetization of society, 
or even genetic discrimination. This was highlighted not least by 
the fact that the concepts of GR for individual agency with regard 
to one’s genetic make-up were only implicit or marginal in our 
text corpus.
cOnclUsiOn anD OUTlOOK
The focus of the qualitative studies in the examined social sci-
ence literature was on the micropolitics of interpersonal rela-
tionships. State institutions, law givers, insurance companies, 
or even the healthcare system as a whole were regarded as the 
bearers of responsibility in only very few studies. This is striking 
because the claim of “responsibilization” of the individual in 
a neoliberal atmosphere is a common critique in more cur-
rent sociological theories, but was only found to be indirectly 
approached in empirical studies (Arribas-Ayllon et  al., 2011; 
Felt and Müller, 2011).
Moreover, the studies we reviewed indicated that the increas-
ing availability of genetic tests for an increasing array of genetic 
conditions with ever more complex and multifactorial causes 
does not seem to have led to an increase in the individual burden 
of responsibility. This is primarily because the salience of GR in 
most socioempirical studies was restricted to the clinical context 
and did not shed light on non-clinical contexts such as direct-to-
consumer applications.
As a result, the studies’ general references to GR were rather 
pragmatic and undertheorized. This is remarkable if one takes 
into account that a significant part (two third) of the studies 
appeared in journals of medical sociology or medical ethics. 
However, they often helped to reveal communicative barriers and 
social or psychological issues in the management of GT practices 
or aimed to contribute to a solution to the pressing psychological, 
legal, and ethical conflicts, contributing to an improvement in the 
current situation. Therefore, it would be worthwhile for future 
studies to apply a more explicit, precise concept of GR to address 
and determine what exactly is at stake.
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